The Comparative Politics Conference 2009, Bergen, 7 October 2009
Øystein Bø, Deputy Permanent Representative
Permanent Delegation of Norway to NATO
CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY
Security in the High North – Perceptions and misperceptions
Climate change and the challenges that are accompanying the melting ice cap and what has been called a new strategic environment have accumulated an increased security related interest for the High North.
Increased interest leads to increased human activity and to a proliferation in studies, scenarios and more or less alarmist views on the future prospects.
From a Norwegian point of view we welcome the increased human activity; in fact we have actively contributed to it. New challenges call for increased presence, activities and knowledge of the Arctic and the areas close to us.
At the same time, we have been abundantly clear that an essential aim of our security policy is to maintain the High North as an area of international cooperation, transparency and stability – or as the Norwegian Foreign Minister Støre has said on several occasions: “High North – Low Tension”.
We simply disagree with those who predict a new race for resources or an increased potential for armed conflict in the High North. When we scrutinize developments in the region it becomes quite clear that there is so far little foundation for such predictions. Many of these alarmist perceptions – not least often conveyed by the media – should in my view rather be grouped under the headline misperceptions or misinterpretations.
This said, please don’t misunderstand me, I do not in any way wish to play down the serious effects caused by climate change – there are a lot of issues to worry about in the High North – that is the reason we are having conferences like this one. But - these are in my view not necessarily found in the security policy domain, where gloomy scenarios could too easily be transferred into self-fulfilling prophesies if they are left unattended. (Like weeds in a lawn)
It is obvious that developments in the High North are interpreted differently by different actors. Difference in opinions is what creates dynamism and bring issues forward. I’ll give you one example: If a country increases its national ability to exercise authority this would by the country in question probably be seen as a necessary step to safeguard stability and environment, and as such, as being done in the interest of all. Others could describe it as a “clear marker”, “escalation” or “competition”.
Today I wish to touch briefly on some of the security related perceptions that are frequently pronounced when the Arctic and the High North are discussed, and why I see some of them as not always being entirely valid. I’ll also say a few words on the discussion on the High North in NATO. Part of what I say reflect the views of the Norwegian Government, while some of my comments are my personal reflections, as it should be at a conference like this. You will understand from the context which is which. And, if it sounds weird to you, it’s probably my own reflection.
1. The melting Ice Cap and the opening up of new waters create a new strategic environment that will have a major impact on Security in the High North
It is a commonly stated view that the melting Ice Cap and the potential for new sea routes and increased access to natural resources have created a new strategic environment that necessarily will have a bearing on security in the area. Objectively seen this assumption is understandable, and I have my self frequently resorted to it. It is beyond doubt that vast new areas of open sea creates new and difficult challenges for the littoral States of the Arctic Rim, not least with a view to exercising authority in areas under their jurisdiction. Increased human activity will probably mean greater need for measures on the softer side of security, such as search and rescue, environmental surveillance and preparedness.
Canada has realised this and has set in motion plans to protect the north, which draws on land, sea, air and space assets from various government departments and agencies, including Transport Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard and the Department of National Defence. Denmark is beginning to consider similar options. This will to some extent involve increased military activity, but it is also as an expression of a comprehensive approach, realizing that having both military and civilian capabilities to solve the same tasks is neither rational, nor cost efficient.
But, strategic environment is more than geographic and other factual circumstances, one also needs to look at threat perceptions, available technology and so on. One example – the development of long range strategic missiles during the cold war dramatically reduced the strategic significance of the Baltic Sea, not because of changes in geography, but simply because of new and more developed technology.
When it comes to the High North, I do not have clear answers as to whether the climate change and the melting ice cap is of crucial importance to the strategic security environment. Last week in London NATO's Secretary General made the highly valid point that “it is difficult to pin down what’s actually changing because of climate change”. He is also partly right in moving to say that “…climate change may have potentially huge security implications, but the response cannot be exclusively military.” (Although I have my doubts as regards “huge”.) We have to place this question in a relevant context and ask ourselves what - for instance - the fact that one side of North America will be much more exposed than before, really means for what is in popular terms called “hard security”.
There is broad international political agreement that there are no major military threats in the Arctic. To the contrary, all the states in the High North are facing the same challenges and possibilities with regard to economic and social development, management of the environment and of resources, and they all have an objective interest in cooperating closely to meet these challenges and make the most of the possibilities. We should focus on this real potential for international cooperation rather than a possible or limited potential for conflict.
Against the background of today’s overall security environment, the climate changes in the Arctic could have a different strategic significance than what is commonly assumed.
In support of this understanding of recent trends and the continuation of stability and low tension, it would of course be helpful if the States involved refrain from actions that can be perceived as worrying military posturing.
2. The race for resources in the High North could create political and even armed conflict.
International media have frequently been using the expression “ a race for the Arctic”, or as Jane’s weekly has put it when dealing with resource issues in the Arctic “In the longer term there is a real prospect of political conflict and military competition given the value of the Arctic resources”.
In my view, these opinions are simplistic, not always well founded, and seem not to have been “checked against reality”. Some of them seem to base themselves on a view of the Arctic as a sort of “Klondyke” where anyone can bring their oilrig and claim an area to themselves. As we have heard earlier today, there are also no major unresolved questions of jurisdiction that could underpin such views.
There is also no “race” for resources in the High North. While it has been claimed that 20 – 25 % of the World’s undiscovered oil and gas resources could be found in the arctic rim, developing the economic activity is a “slow pace” exercise. There are long term perspectives in the petroleum sector, and all present activity takes place in undisputed areas. There is a well functioning international management system of the fish stocks in the High North, and there is no reason to assume that this would not be the case if fisheries should be initiated in the Arctic Sea. (From time to time we have discussions on the relationship between NATO and Russia in the NATO Headquarters, and one of the arguments I often use to display the value of engaging with Russia, is how well we have managed the Arctic Cod and other species through the Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission). As regards sailing routes and international shipping, there is a well developed international cooperation mainly through the International Maritime Organisation, and there are no major disputes on principles, although there is some disagreement between the USA and Canada as regards the routes through the North West Passage.
So, where do I want to go with this? Well, the fact is that if one State initiates economic activity on areas under its jurisdiction, that does not prevent or discourage other States from doing the same in areas under their jurisdiction, to the contrary, it probably lowers the threshold for initiating such activity. To put it simple; there is no “zero sum game” that a “race” would imply.
3. Unresolved jurisdiction issues create uncertainty)
We’ve just had a session on matters of international law, so I will not spend time on this here. But, both the perception that there are major unresolved jurisdiction issues, and, as some has claimed, that there is a need for a new instrument of international law governing the Arctic and inspired by the Antarctic Treaty are misperceptions that do not necessarily contribute to peace and stability in the High North.
I am also not touching on the Svalbard Archipelago, even though misperceptions are rife when it comes to legal issues in that regard. But, respect for the undisputed Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard and for Norwegian jurisdiction under international law in the surrounding maritime areas is of course essential for ensuring security in the high north.
4. Increased military activity and the presence of strategic capabilities is a sign of a regional conflict potential.
Let us not beat around the bush on this one. The issue at hand here is mainly issue of Russian air or naval bases at the Kola Peninsula, and the increase in missions stemming from them. This has by some been interpreted as a sign of increased Russian regional ambitions and as a show of force in order to intimidate other actors. Again, this is simplistic. As we have heard from ambassador Andrejev, Russia has important and fully legitimate interests in the High North, and is for obvious reasons a major actor in this area. Russia has a long standing tradition for scientific research and other activities, not least economic, in this region, a tradition that is a proud and important part of Russian national identity. It is therefore not problematic that Russia, in a situation where we expect increased human activity in the High North, wishes to exercise its legitimate authority.
In our view, it is hard to see that it would not be in Russia’s own interest to preserve the low tension in the High North and the Arctic. Traditionally, a frozen Arctic Sea and limited human activity has implied a limited need for capabilities in the High North, as most of Russia’s security challenges are found elsewhere. Given the challenges that Russia is facing, one could assume that a build up of forces beyond those needed to deal with the actual issues at hand in the Arctic is not in Russia’s interest.
This has been our point of departure when we are assessing the increased Russian activity, including the fact that the Northern Fleet is based close to our borders. This is in our view not a result of perceived problems in the region, but has other and partly historic reasons.
5. NATO sees the development in the Arctic and the High North as a threat and the Alliance will most likely increase its activity
First some hard facts: Whereas the North Atlantic Treaty limits its southern application to the Tropic of Cancer, there is no such limitation to the North (North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer-North Atlantic Treaty Article 6).
This means that the area of interest for the Alliance stretches all the way from the Tropic of Cancer to the North Pole. With one exception, all the nations surrounding the North Pole are members of the Alliance, covering slightly more than 50 % of the circum-polar areas. The remainder is covered by one other nation – Russia.
It is an established principle that all parts of Allied territory shall enjoy equal security, and the High North is no exception. This is of course of importance to a Northern ally like Norway.
During the cold war the High North was of significant strategic importance. There was much attention to developments in this area, and, as exemplified by the regular winter exercises in Norway and a fair amount of other allied activity.
Following the end of the Cold War this changed , as other and more pressing tasks came into focus. It is from time to time jokingly said that, during the last ten years, all the Maps of the Northern part of the Alliance have stopped somewhere around the 60 latitude, just North of Oslo. Think about this the next time you watch the CNN or BBC weather forecast for Europe
Over the last years NATO has had much of its focus on Afghanistan, and as we all know, keeping two sets of ideas in the head the same time is difficult, (in particular for some of the predominantly male environments often found in the Security Policy Domain, as it is well known that multitasking is difficult for men. But jokes aside)
There is no doubt that Afghanistan is currently our most demanding task and that Allies should all do their best to contribute to this complex mission. But, public and political support for operations at strategic distance is a function of the overall legitimacy of the Alliance, including its perceived ability to deal with the individual and regional security concerns of its members.
This is why Norway last year launched an initiative to raise NATO's profile and to strengthen the relevance, legitimacy and support for NATO in all member states. The initiative suggested a series of low intensity measures - such as giving a distinct regional responsibility to the regional commands and improving situational awareness on allied territory and its periphery, and is now being developed further, side by side with further development of NATO’s expeditionary capabilities.
The initiative was not about bringing NATO home - but to make it clear that NATO never left. It was not about a need for new resources - but to ensure that we use what we got more efficiently. It was also not about re-balancing the roles and tasks of the Alliance away from operations such as in Afghanistan - but to ensure that we are able to carry out the full set of alliance missions with one set of deployable and flexible forces.
Our initiative was a generic one, and as valid for the Bay of Biscay, the Mediterranean or the High North. That is one of the reasons it was widely supported.
But as the High North for obvious reasons is important to Norwegians, it should come as no surprise that to us this initiative is particularly valid for the High North.
Against this background, and of course also taking into account the new and uncertain situation created by climate change, Norway has been working to increase the level of attention and knowledge of all Allies on the relevant aspects of developments in the High North. Foreign Minister Støre has twice briefed the North Atlantic Council on the High North; briefings that have generated increased Allied interest of this region.
Other Allies close to the Arctic, such as Canada, Iceland, and the USA have contributed to this. Iceland hosted the first ever NATO seminar on Security Prospects in the High North in January this year. The participants at the seminar agreed that a renewed NATO situational awareness in the High North should concentrate on where NATO can provide added value to regional security and maintain low tension in the region. They also underscored that it remains a priority to preserve the current stability in the High North as a region of low tension by managing the ongoing limited increase in military activities in a transparent, deliberate and measured way.
So we can no doubt speak about a renewed NATO interest in the Arctic and the High North. But renewed interest does not automatically mean increased activity across the board, and does not imply that NATO has a role to play in every aspect. Increased knowledge, understanding and awareness are perhaps the most important. As I said earlier, the potential for cooperation and partnership is more interesting than the limited potential for political or military conflict. Hence, I do not entirely agree with Admiral James Stavridis, the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (SACEUR) who at the Royal United Services Institute in London last week is quoted to have said that “I look at the High North and I think it could either be a zone of conflict, I hope not, a zone of competition, probably”. To be sure he moves on to underline that “as an alliance we should make this as co-operative as we can”. That I agree with.
Nevertheless, we have to recognise that all Arctic Rim States have legitimate interest in a limited military activity in these areas. As for the Allies such activities are today held at a minimum level, and there are no immediate plans for major changes or increases. We might see increased awareness because of the changing environment, and we will continue to see limited NATO presence in the High North. But it would be wrong to brand this presence as illegitimate, superfluous, provocative or in any way directed against any other state.
To reflect on NATO’s role on a purely personal basis, the main goal for an increased focus in NATO on the High North should be to maintain this as a region characterised by a stable and peaceful development. More concretely NATO could play a role by being one arena for building situational awareness and knowledge among Allies (and Partners), and in areas such as surveillance and monitoring, co-operation on Search and Rescue, the protection of critical infrastructure on Allied territory - and in relation to capability development and interoperability against the backdrop of the challenges posed by the extreme arctic climate, including training and exercises – also with Russia.
In closing, let me briefly return to Russia. The relationship with Russia is of course an important element when the High North and the Arctic are being discussed at NATO. Following the impasse caused by last years Georgia crisis, the NATO Russia Council (NRC) is now again picking up speed as the valuable tool for dialogue and practical cooperation among Allies and Russia that it should be.
Russia is an indispensable partner in the Arctic and the High North, and there can in fact be no meaningful circum-polar cooperation without Russia. The Arctic Council is the leading international forum for discussions on the Arctic. We should, however, also look into using the NRC as a forum for discussing security related issues of relevance to the High North and the Arctic. Building trust and developing a partnership on such issues among all the 29 members of the NRC would be a real and significant step to maintaining the High North as a region on international cooperation, transparency and stability.
Those who have visited the Russian Consulate General in Barentsburg on Spitsbergen will remember a tapestry which beautifully depicts the Northern Lights flanked by the famous Russian explorer Vladimir Alexandrovich Rusanov on one side and the Norwegian Fritjof Nansen on the other side. I still vividly remember the feeling of mutual respect, common history and common challenges the tapestry left me with, when I saw it for the first time 21 years ago. It is this kind of partnership and respect we should look for in the High North. We should definitely not underestimate climate change and the challenges caused by it. But, at the same time we should also not just accept the gloom and doom when it comes to possible consequences for security in the High North, but rather look at the increasing potential for cooperation and partnership to meet these challenges.
Thank you